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Abstract: Private Information Retrieval (PIR), despite being
well studied, is computationally costly and arduous to scale.
We explore lower-cost relaxations of information-theoretic
PIR, based on dummy queries, sparse vectors, and composi-
tions with an anonymity system. We prove the security of each
scheme using a flexible differentially private definition for pri-
vate queries that can capture notions of imperfect privacy. We
show that basic schemes are weak, but some of them can be
made arbitrarily safe by composing them with large anonymity
systems.
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1 Introduction
Despite many years of research and significant advances, Pri-
vate Information Retrieval (PIR) still suffers from scalabil-
ity issues that were identified some time ago [31]: both in-
formation theoretic [10] (IT-PIR) and computational [26] PIR
schemes require database servers to operate on all records for
each private query to conceal the sought record. Thus, as the
database grows, the time to process each query grows linearly
in theory, and super-linearly in practice: as the data processed
exceeds the CPU cache, it has to be fetched from the main
memory and eventually persistent storage. Furthermore, in IT-
PIR each query is processed by multiple PIR servers. As the
number of servers increases, so do the communication and
computation costs.
Yet the need to privately access large public databases
is pressing: for example Certificate Transparency [22], which
strengthens TLS certificate issuing, requires clients to look up
certificates for sites they have visited, resulting in privacy con-
cerns. The current size of the certificate database precludes
trivial downloading of the entire set and requires PIR [23],
but it cannot scale to the ubiquitous use of TLS in the future.
More scalable systems are therefore needed, even at the cost
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of lowering the quality of protection1. Similarly, as the Tor
network [13] grows it becomes untenable to broadcast infor-
mation about all servers to all clients, and a private querying
mechanism [24] will have to be implemented to prevent at-
tacks based on partial knowledge of the network [11].
To address this challenge, we present designs that lower
the traditional PIR costs, but leak more information to adver-
saries. Quantifying that leakage is therefore necessary and we
propose a game-based differential privacy definition [14] to
evaluate and minimize the risk introduced. This definition can
also be used to demonstrate the inadequacy of folk designs
for private queries: in the first design, a client queries an un-
trusted database by looking up the sought record along with
other ‘dummy’ records [5, 19, 21] to confuse the adversary; in
the second design, a client fetches a record from an untrusted
database through an anonymity system [13, 15] to hide the
correspondence between the client and the server.
The contributions of this paper are:
– We present and motivate a flexible differential privacy-
based PIR definition, through a simple adversary distin-
guishability game, to analyze lighter-weight protocols and
estimate their risk. This is necessary to quantify leak-
age, but can also capture systems that are arbitrarily pri-
vate, including computationally and unconditionally pri-
vate schemes.
– We argue that simple private retrieval systems using dum-
mies and anonymous channels are not secure under this
definition. A number of proposed systems have made use
of such private query mechanisms, and we show they can
lead to catastrophic loss of privacy when the adversary has
side information.
– We present a number of variants of PIR schemes that sat-
isfy our definition, and compare their security and cost.
Our key result is that their composition with an anonymity
system can achieve arbitrarily good levels of privacy,
leading to highly secure alternatives to traditional PIR
schemes.
– As a means to achieving the above we present a generic
composition theorem of differentially private systems
with anonymity channels, which is of independent inter-
est.
1 The privacy offered today by Certificate Transparency is simply to have
clients download a range of certificates instead of just one. See below for
our analysis of this naive dummy requests mechanism.
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– We present an optimization to reduce PIR costs and speed
up an IT-PIR scheme by contacting fewer databases, and
evaluate it using a Chor-like scheme as an example.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present re-
lated work on PIR, anonymity systems, and the uses of dif-
ferential privacy in the remainder of this section. After intro-
ducing the paper’s notations, we define the threat model and
present the privacy definitions in Section 2. We then demon-
strate why the use of dummies and anonymity system alone
does not guarantee privacy under our definitions in Section 3
and present our -private designs and an optimization to cut
the computation cost in Sections 4 and 5. Finally in Section 6,
we discuss the costs and efficiency of the designs before con-
cluding the paper in Section 7.
1.1 Related Work
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) was introduced in 1995
by Chor et al. [10] to enable private access to public database
records. As initially proposed, PIR provided information-
theoretic privacy protection (IT-PIR) but required multiple
non-collaborating servers each with a copy of the database.
Later, Computational PIR (CPIR) [26] was proposed using a
single server, but its practicality has been questioned as being
slower than simply downloading the entire database at typical
network speeds [31]. Since that time, however, newer CPIR
schemes that are significantly faster than downloading the en-
tire database have been proposed [1, 2, 25]. While IT-PIR of-
fers perfect privacy—the confidentiality of the query cannot be
breached even with unlimited resources—it is still a computa-
tional burden on multiple databases, since all records must be
processed for each query and by each server. IT-PIR has been
gradually enhanced over time with new capabilities, such as
batch processing [20], multi-block queries [17] and tolerance
to misbehaving servers [6]. Alternative approaches to scaling
PIR include using trusted hardware elements [4].
Research on Anonymity Systems (AS) began in 1981 by
David Chaum introducing the mixnet for anonymous e-mail
[9]. Other AS applications were then studied, such as peer-to-
peer and web browsing, in particular in the context of Onion
Routing and Tor [13]. The Anonymity System accepts a batch
of messages and routes them while hiding the correspondence
between senders and receivers. Low-latency anonymity sys-
tems, however, may still fail under attacks such as traffic anal-
ysis and fingerprinting [32]. Cascade mix networks offer per-
fect privacy at the cost of lower performance [7]. In this work
we will always consider an ideal anonymity system that can
be abstracted, from the perspective of an adversary, as an un-
known random permutation of input messages to output mes-
sages. Real-world instantiations are imperfect and security pa-
rameters may have to be adapted, or in the case of onion rout-
ing systems [13] some additional batching and mixing may be
required.
Differential Privacy definitions and mechanisms were first
presented in 2006 [14] to enable safe interactions with statis-
tical databases. However, this definition has since been used
in machine learning [30], cloud computing [27], and location
indistinguishability together with PIR [3] to evaluate and min-
imize the privacy risk. Differentially private definitions have
several advantages: they capture the intrinsic loss of privacy
due to using a mechanism, and they are not affected by side
information the adversary may hold. Well-known composi-
tion theorems can be applied. We note that Chor et al. [10]
also make passing allusion to statistical and leaky definitions
of PIR in their seminal paper, only to focus on perfectly
information-theoretic schemes.
2 Definitions and -Privacy
In this work we characterize as PIR any system where a user
inputs a secret index of a record in a public database, and even-
tually is provided with this record, without a defined adver-
sary learning the index. We note that the systems we propose
use different mechanisms from traditional IT-PIR and CPIR,
and make different security assumptions. Yet they provide the
same functionality and interface, and in many cases can be
used as drop-in replacements for traditional PIR.
2.1 Notation
Entities. All systems we explore allow u users U , i ∈ J1, uK,
to perform q queries by sending p requests to the database
system DS. A database system DS is composed of d ∈ N
replicated databases DBi∈J1,dK. Each of them stores the same
n records of standardized size b bits. We assume a cascade
mix network provides an anonymous channel all users can ac-
cess. We abstract this Anonymity System as one secure sub-
system providing a perfectly secret bi-directional permutation
between input and output messages.
When presenting mechanisms not using the anonymity
system we will simply present the interactions of a single user
with the database servers, and assume that all user queries can
be answered by trivial parallel composition. However, when
reasoning about PIR systems using an anonymity system, all
user queries are assumed to transit though the anonymous
channel.
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Costs. This work studies PIR scalability, and we focus on an-
alyzing costs on the server side, which is the performance bot-
tleneck of current techniques. We denote the communication
costs by Cc for the number of bits sent by the client to DS,
and by Cs for the number of b-bit record blocks sent by DS to
the client. The computation cost Cp corresponds to the sum,
for each record accessed, of the record access cost and the
processing cost by the servers (e.g., the number of XORs),
Cp = Nrecord access · (cacc + cprc).
2.2 Privacy Definition
Threat Model. We consider an adversary A has corrupted da
databases out of d, in order to discover the queries of a target
user Ut. These corrupted servers passively record and share all
requests they observe to achieve this objective. We also assume
that the adversary observes all the user’s incoming and out-
going communication. However, in all presented systems, the
requests are encrypted with the servers’ public keys, and we
assume that for communication with honest servers, only mes-
sage timing, volume and size are ultimately visible to the ad-
versary. Similarly, using standard mix cascade techniques [7],
we assume the adversary cannot distinguish the correspon-
dences of input and output messages through an anonymity
system. We also assume that the other u − 1 users in the sys-
tem are honest, in that they will not provide the adversary any
of the secrets they generate or use. However, the adversary also
knows the distribution of their queries—a necessary assump-
tion to model attacks based on side or background information.
Security Definitions. We define (,δ)-privacy as a flexible pri-
vacy metric to fully capture weaker as well as strong privacy-
friendly search protocols. The definition relies on the follow-
ing game between the adversary and honest users: an adver-
sary provides a target user Ut with two queries Qi and Qj ,
and to each other user Uk, a query Qnk from the non-target
query set Qn, |Qn| ≤ u − 1. The target Ut selects one of the
two queries, and uses the PIR system in order to execute it,
and the others execute the corresponding Qnk , leading to the
adversary observing a trace of eventsO. This trace includes all
information from corrupt servers and all metadata of encrypted
communications from the network. We then define privacy as
follows:
Privacy Definition 1. A protocol provides (, δ)-private PIR
if there are non-negative constants  and δ, such that for any
possible adversary-provided queries Qi, Qj , and 〈Qnk〉, and
for all possible adversarial observations O in the observation
space Ω we have that
Pr(O|Qi) ≤ e · Pr(O|Qj) + δ.
Note that for notational convenience, we write Pr(O|Qi) (and
similarly for Qj), showing the conditional to be on the target
user’s choice, even though technically the condition is over the
vector 〈Qnk〉 of non-target queries as well.
In the important special case where δ = 0 we call the stronger
property -privacy, and can also define the likelihood ratio L:
Privacy Definition 2. The likelihood ratio of a particular
observation O in an -private PIR scheme is defined by:
Pr(O|Qi)/Pr(O|Qj) ≤ e, and the likelihood ratio of the
scheme itself is the maximal such value:
L = max
Qi,Qj ,〈Qnk 〉,O
Pr(O|Qi)
Pr(O|Qj) ≤ e
.
These definitions combine aspects of game-based crypto-
graphic definitions and also differential privacy. We first note
how the target user Ut may chose either Qi or Qj with arbi-
trary a-priori probability, rather than at random. The prior pref-
erence between those does not affect Pr(O|Qi) or Pr(O|Qj)
that relate to the quantity to be bounded, making this definition
independent of the adversary’s prior knowledge of the target
user’s query.
Similarly the defined security game assumes that the ad-
versary knows precisely the queries of all users except the tar-
get (U \ Ut), thus capturing any susceptibility to side informa-
tion they would have about the queries of other users. We note
that while users are provided with adversarial queries, the ad-
versary does not learn either any user secrets created as part of
the PIR protocols or the user requests sent to honest database
servers.
Generality and necessity of definition. In the preferable case
δ = 0, the likelihood ratio of any observation is bounded, and
we can therefore cap privacy leakage in all cases. A non-zero
δ denotes cases where the leakage may be unbounded: events
catastrophic to privacy may occur with probability at most δ.
In those cases, requiring δ to be a negligible function yields
a traditional computational cryptographic scheme. Note, how-
ever, that while negligible δ is sufficient to yield CPIR, not all
CPIR schemes (unlike traditional IT-PIR) will have a finite ,
as computational indistinguishability does not imply statistical
closeness.
In the case  = 0, we recover the cryptographic defini-
tion of indistinguishability. The traditional unconditional se-
curity provided by IT-PIR is equivalent to a mechanism with
 = 0. For  > 0 information about the query selected leaks
at a non-negligible rate, and users should rate-limit recurring
or correlated queries as for other differentially private mecha-
nisms [14].
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Thus we lose no generality by using this definition: it
can capture information-theoretic PIR systems, computational
PIR systems, as well as systems that leak more information.
In the rest of the paper we will define such leaky systems,
making this relaxed definition necessary; we will also show
that the composition of an -private PIR mechanism with an
anonymity system can lead to systems that provide arbitrarily
good privacy.
As for the original differential privacy definition, the -
private PIR definition (with δ = 0) ensures that there is no
observation providing the adversary certainty to include or ex-
clude any queries from the a-priori query set. When a PIR sys-
tem does not provide such a guarantee there exist observations
that allow the adversary to exclude candidate queries with cer-
tainty, leading to poor composition under repeated queries, as
studied in the next section. Deciding what maximum value for
epsilon is desirable depends on the sensitivity of the query and
overall sought level of privacy but also usability. For instance,
an epsilon lower than 10−2 can be considered acceptable as
it implies that any particular query is only 1% more likely
to have been sent than another. Furthermore, the composition
of non -private PIR schemes with an anonymity channel is
not guaranteed to approach perfect privacy as it may leak a
lot of information to an adversary with side information about
the target, or knowledge about the queries performed by other
users.
3 Non -Private Systems
In this section we analyze two approaches to achieving query
privacy that we show are not -private. We also examine their
properties for extreme and impractical security parameters as
well as when they are composed with an anonymity system.
We note that the literature does not refer to those as “Pri-
vate Information Retrieval” or PIR, reserving this term for in-
formation theoretically and computationally secure schemes.
Yet these ad-hoc systems fulfill the same privacy and func-
tional role as PIR: they are used to lookup a record privately
out of a public database, at a lower cost compared with IT-
PIR or CPIR. Thus we examine them, analyze their properties,
and use some of their ideas as ingredients to build more robust
low-cost systems.
3.1 Naive Dummy Requests
A number of works attempt to hide a true user query to a sin-
gle untrusted database, by hiding it among a number p of artifi-
cially generated user queries (‘dummies’) to achieve some pri-
vacy; for example OB-PWS [5] in the context of web search,
and Hong and Landay [19] and Kido et al. [21] in the context
of private location queries. Zhao et al. propose a dummy-based
privacy mechanism for DNS lookups [33], but Hermann et al.
find its security lacking [18]. It is interesting to note that both
location and DNS applications involve large databases mak-
ing traditional PIR prohibitively expensive. We show that this
mechanism is not -private, leading occasionally to spectacu-
lar information leaks as reported.
Algorithm 3.1: Naive Dummy Requests (User)
Input: Query Q (0 ≤ Q < n);
Security parameter p (p > 1);
1 Req ← {Q};
2 while |Req| < p do
3 Q′ ← random(n);
4 Req ← Req ∪Q′;
5 forall r ∈ Req do
6 (indexr, recr)← sendreceive(DS, r);
7 return recQ;
The function random(n) samples uniformly an integer
from 0 to n − 1, and sendreceive(D,m) sends a message m
to D, and returns any response from D.
Vulnerability Theorem 1. The Naive Dummy Requests
mechanism for security parameter p < n is not -private.
Proof. The adversary controlling the database observes which
records are queried. Without loss of generality, in case the
user queries for Qi, with some probability A does not see
the query requesting record j : Qj . We denote by Pr(O|Qi)
the probability an adversary A observes a trace of events O
knowing the query Qi was sent. Thereby, as the adversary
has not seen the query Qj in the current observation O, the
adversary knows the record j was not sought by the user,
hence Pr(O|Qj) = 0. Consequently, there is no  such that
Pr(O|Qi)/Pr(O|Qj) ≤ e. As the -privacy bound must
apply for any observation O, and requests Qi and Qj , this
counter example shows that the use of dummies alone does
not guarantee -privacy.
Practically, this means that if p < n, the adversary observ-
ing the database system DS will be able to learn, with perfect
certainty, that records that have not been requested are not the
sought record Q. Thus, this mechanism is not -private, until
p = n at which point it becomes perfectly private ( = 0) and
corresponds to the naive download of the full database.
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This weakness has practical implications: in the case of a
location privacy mechanism an adversary learns which loca-
tions a user is not in with certainty, and in the context of DNS
lookups, which domains are not being requested. If using this
naive scheme in the context of DP5 [8], a system using PIR to
protect users’ social networks, an adversary would learn with
certainty which social links are not present at each query.
3.2 Naive Anonymous Requests
Sending a query through an anonymity system has been pro-
posed to maintain privacy against an untrusted database: the
seminal Tor system [13] supports private queries to websites,
but also performs anonymous requests as a way to resolve
dot-onion addresses to rendezvous points. Privé [15] uses an
anonymity system to query location-based services, and an-
other proposal to perform private search engine queries [28].
However, this technique alone does not provide -private PIR.
Algorithm 3.2: Naive Anon. Request (User)
Input: Query Q (0 ≤ Q < n);
1 (indexQ, recQ)← anonsendreceive(DS,Q);
2 return recQ;
In this mechanism users simply send requests for
the records they seek to the database service through a
bi-directional anonymity channel, allowing for anonymous
replies (the anonsendreceive function). Upon receiving an
anonymous request for a record, the database server simply
sends the record back to the user though the anonymous chan-
nel. The hope is that since multiple queries are mixed together,
the exact query of the target user is obscured. However, there
is significant leakage and the mechanism in not -private.
Vulnerability Theorem 2. The Naive Anonymous Requests
mechanism is not -private, for any number of users u using
the system.
Proof. Following our game-based definition for -privacy
non-target clients’ queries are provided by the adversary and
are all in Qn. As the adversary can select a non-target query
set Qn that does not contain Qi or Qj , the adversary will ob-
serve one of Qi or Qj only, and all other requests will be in
Qn. For the recordQx, x ∈ {i, j} that is not queried, the prob-
ability Pr(O|Qx) equals zero, and the likelihood ratio L goes
to infinity. Thus there exists no  that may bound this likeli-
hood.
The proof relies heavily on the fact that the adversary provides
all non-target users with known queries from the non-target
query set Qn and is therefore able to filter those out at the
corrupt database server, and uncover trivially the target user’s
query. This is an extreme model; however, it also covers re-
alistic attacks. For example, if the adversary knows that most
other users are not going to access either Qi or Qj , but sus-
pects that the target user might, a single observation can con-
firm this suspicion. This could be the case, for example, when
users attempt to look up unpopular, or even personal records
that only concern, and are accessed by, the target. The fact that
the security parameter of the system, namely the number of
users, does not affect security is particularly damning.
3.3 Composing Naive Mechanisms
Interestingly, the composition of the two naive mechanisms,
namely when multiple users perform Naive Dummy Re-
quests through an anonymous channel, for any p > 1, the
mechanism becomes (, δ)-private. This simply involves re-
placing the sendreceive method with an anonymous channel
anonsendreceive in the Naive Dummy Requests algorithm.
As the number of users u increases the probability δ any record
is requested zero or u times exactly becomes negligible and
then there exists an  that satisfies the definition.
More specifically, in our indistinguishability game sce-
nario, the probability the adversary observes exactly u queries
Qi is bounded above by δu ≤
(
p−1
n−1
)u−1
while the proba-
bility they receive no Qi queries is bounded above by δ0 ≤(
n−p
n−1
)u−1
. (The proof can be found in Appendix A.1.) This
requires a large number of users u or volume of dummies p to
provide meaningful privacy against the single corrupt server.
For this reason we instead explore multi-server mechanisms in
the next sections.
4 Four -Private PIR Systems
4.1 Direct Requests
The first -private PIR mechanism uses dummy queries on
multiple PIR databases, of which da are adversarial and (d −
da) are honest. The user generates a query for the sought
record, along with p − 1 random (distinct) other ones. The
requests are partitioned into sets of equal size and sent to the
PIR databases directly. Each database then responds with the
list of records requested, encrypted as are all communications.
The database servers simply respond to requests by re-
turning the index and the records sought over the encrypted
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Algorithm 4.1: Direct Requests (User)
Input:
Q: (0 ≤ Q < n);
p: (p > 1) ∧ p ≡ 0 mod d;
1 Req ← {Q};
2 while |Req| < p do
3 Q′ ← random(n);
4 if Q′ 6∈ Req then
5 Req ← Req ∪Q′;
6 for 1 ≤ i ≤ d do
7 for 1 ≤ j ≤ p/d do
8 r ← pop(Req)
(indexr, recr)← sendreceive(DBi, r);
9 return recQ;
channel. pop(Req) returns a random item from the set Req
(and also removes it from Req). recQ is the sought record of
index Q.
Security Theorem 1. The direct requests mechanism is an -
private PIR mechanism with
 = ln
(
1
d− da ·
(
d · n− 1
p− 1 − da
))
,
where d is the number of databases, of which da are adversar-
ial, n is the total number of records, and p is the total number
of queries sent by the user.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Costs. The client needs to communicate p/d record indices to
each of d servers. How to best do this depends on the size of
p/d. If p/d is small, the best way is simply to send the p/d
indices (each of size dlgne bits) to each of d servers, for a
total cost of p · dlgne bits. However, if p/d is large, it is more
efficient to simply send an n-bit bitmask to each server, for a
total cost of d·n bits. Therefore the total client communication
is Cc = min (d · n, p · dlgne) bits. The server communication
cost is just Cs = p, as p records are requested and sent back
to the user. As the databases do not XOR any records but just
accesses and sends them, the computation cost isCp = p·cacc.
Practical values. Fig. 1 illustrates Direct Request curves rep-
resenting  as a function of p for different adversaries in the
reference scenario of Certificate Transparency. As millions of
certificates have already been recorded in databases and hun-
dreds of databases are supposed to be running all over the
world, we have set n = 106 and d = 102. The security pa-
rameter  starts above 10 and slowly diminishes until nearly
all of the records have been requested where the curves follow
10-1
100
101
102
100 101 102 103 104 105 106
ε
p
da = d-1
da = 0.90*d
da = 0.50*d
da = 0.10*d
Fig. 1. Direct requests:  versus p for d = 100 and n = 106
the vertical asymptote p = n. If weaker adversaries decrease 
for any p, the difference becomes really noticeable only after
requesting a tenth of the records. Further, in order to achieve
even a mediocre security of  < 1, for any da, more than 910
of the records have to be requested. In the worst-case scenario
where only one database is not colluding, we find the security
parameter  is approximately equal to 11.5. However if only
half of the databases are corrupted, i.e. da = 12 · d, we have
 ≈ 7.6. To summarize for n = 106, d = 102 and p = 10 · d,
if da = d − 1 we have  ≈ 11.5 while if da = d2 , we have
 ≈ 7.6. For any da, to obtain  < 1, p > 910 · n.
In the case of a small database system consisting of a
few to tens of databases, each storing thousands of records,
we set n = 103 and d = 10. When the adversary controls
all databases but one, if the user only sends one request per
database we have that  ≈ 7 while when half of the databases
are corrupted, da = 12 · d, we have  ≈ 5.4. To summarize for
n = 103, d = 10 and p = d, if da = d − 1 we have  ≈ 7
while if da = d2 , we have  ≈ 5.4.
The above examples illustrate that for large databases, as
the one considered in the motivating Certificate Transparency
example, an adversary controlling about half the databases can
extract a lot of information. Furthermore, information leakage
does not diminish significantly based on the security param-
eter p, or for smaller databases. Thus we conclude the Direct
Requests mechanism alone provides very weak privacy; how-
ever, we will show how its composition with an anonymity
system can improve its performance.
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4.2 Anonymous direct requests
Bundled anonymous request
We compose the direct requests mechanism from the previ-
ous subsection with an anonymous channel. Each user, includ-
ing the target user Ut, sends a bundle of requests defined by
the direct requests PIR mechanism to databases through an
anonymity system AS.
The requests are bundled, in that all requests from a spe-
cific user are linkable with each other, allowing this mecha-
nism to be implemented by sending a single anonymous mes-
sage through the AS per user. The AS’s exit node receiving
the bundle forwards the different sets of queries (as usual, en-
crypted by the user to each respective database) to the relevant
database and anonymously returns the requested records from
each database.
The increased privacy of this scheme derives from the
ability of the target user Ut to hide the use of the PIR system
amongst u−1 other users. This strengthens the direct requests
mechanism hiding Ut’s query amongst p− 1 random requests
throughout d servers. The adversary’s task becomes harder as
any bundle, out of u, could be the target’s, and any query, out
of p, the correct one.
When seeing one of the non-target queriesQnk , the adver-
sary can however link the corresponding bundle to a non-target
user Uk with overwhelming probability, discard it, and thus re-
duce the his analysis to fewer users. Not to discard the target’s
bundle, the adversary should minimize the probability the tar-
get user chooses an element ofQn, which equals (p−1)· |Qn|n .
To do so, the adversary thus should send the same non-target
query Qnk to all non-target users, creating a non-target query
set of size 1; that is, simply choosingQn = {Q0}would result
in the best observation for the adversary.
The database servers simply respond to bundles by re-
turning the index and the records sought over the encrypted
channel, the anonymity system forwarding the answer to the
corresponding users.
Security Theorem 2. The bundled anonymous requests
mechanism is -private with
 = ln
((
d
d− da ·
n− 1
p− 1 −
da
d− da
)2
+ u− 1
)
− ln u.
Proof. By applying our Composition Lemma (see below), and
the security parameter of the direct requests mechanism.
Costs. As the only differences with the Direct Request case
is the Anonymity system and the bundling of the messages,
we find the same values for the communication costs Cc =
min (d · n, p · dlgne) and Cs = p, and the computation cost
Cp = p · cacc.
Algorithm 4.2: Bundled Anonymous Requests (User)
Input:
Q: (0 ≤ Q < n);
p: (p > 1) ∧ p ≡ 0 mod d;
1 Req ← {Q};
2 while |Req| < p do
3 Q′ ← random(n);
4 if Q′ 6∈ Req then
5 Req ← Req ∪Q′;
6 Bundle← {}
7 for 1 ≤ i ≤ d do
8 for 1 ≤ j ≤ p/d do
9 Bundlei ← pop(Req)
10 Bundle← (DBi, Bundlei)
11 (indexr, recr)← anonsendreceive(DS,Bundle);
12 return recQ;
Separated anonymous request
We may also compose the direct requests mechanism
(Sect. 4.1) with an anonymous channel in a different manner.
Each user, including the target user Ut, sends distinct requests
defined by the direct requests PIR mechanism to databases
through an anonymity system AS, whose queries are unlink-
able at the mix output.
The requests are separated, in that all requests from a spe-
cific user are unlinkable with each other, allowing this mecha-
nism to be implemented by sending separate anonymous mes-
sages through the AS to different databases. The AS’s exit
node receiving the message forwards it to the relevant database
and anonymously returns the requested record.
The increased privacy of this scheme derives from the
ability of the target user Ut to hide the real query of the PIR
system amongst u · (p− 1) other random queries.
Algorithm 4.3: Separated Anonymous Requests (User)
Input:
Q: (0 ≤ Q < n);
p: (1 < p) ∧ p ≡ 0 mod d;
1 Req ← {Q};
2 while |Req| < p do
3 Q′ ← random(0, n);
4 if Q′ 6∈ Req then
5 Req ← Req ∪Q′;
6 forall i ∈ p do
7 r ← pop(Req);
8 (indexr, recr)← anonsendreceive(DSi, r);
9 return recQ;
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Fig. 2. AS-Bundle:  versus p for d = 100, n = 106, and u = 103
Since the Bundled Anonymous Requests mechanism
leaks strictly more information than Separated Anonymous
Request, the bundle is also an upper bound of the Separated
Anonymous Request.
Costs. As this method is similar with the Bundled case, we
have for costs Cc = min (d · n, p · dlgne), Cs = p and
Cp = p · cacc. However, the load on the anonymity system
increases as there are u · p anonymous messages transmitted.
Practical values. Fig. 2 shows Direct Request composed with
anonymity system curves representing  as a function of p for
different adversaries in the reference scenario of Certificate
Transparency. As before, we set n = 106 and d = 102 and
assumed u = 103. The security parameter  starts above 10
and slowly diminishes until a tenth to most of the records have
been recorded depending on da where the curves follow the
vertical asymptote p = n. The anonymity system gain in pri-
vacy can be seen under the line indicating where the privacy
of the Direct Request protocol, without an anonymity system,
stops for the same amount of points. If the anonymity sys-
tem gains appear negative at the beginning of the curves, this
is due to the lack of tightness of the bound in the Composi-
tion Lemma. If weaker adversaries decrease  for any p, the
difference becomes really noticeable only after requesting a
hundredth of the records. Further, in order to achieve even
a mediocre security of  < 1, for any da, at most half of
the records have to be requested compared to 90% without
an anonymity system. In the worst-case scenario where only
one database is not colluding, we find the security parameter
 is approximately equal to 16. However if only half of the
databases are corrupted, i.e. da = 12 · d, we have  ≈ 8. To
summarize for n = 106, d = 102, u = 103 and p = 10 · d, if
da = d− 1 we have  ≈ 16 while if da = d2 , we have  ≈ 8.
In the case of a small database system managing a few
to tens of databases, each storing thousands of records, we
again set n = 103 and d = 10. When the adversary con-
trols all databases but one, each sending only one request per
database, we have that  ≈ 7 while when half of the databases
are corrupted, da = 12 · d, we have  ≈ 4. To summarize for
n = 103, d = 10, u = 103 and p = d, if da = d− 1 we have
 ≈ 7 while if da = d2 , we have  ≈ 4.
We conclude that direct requests through an anonymity
system is a stronger mechanism that direct requests alone.
However, for very large databases, such as the one expected in
Certificate Transparency, the quality of protection is still low.
It becomes better only as the total volume of requests from all
users is in the order of magnitude of the number of records in
the database. This requires either a large number of users, or a
large number of dummy requests per user. However, even the
weaker protection afforded by anonymous direct requests may
be sufficient to protect privacy in applications where records
only need to be accessed infrequently.
4.3 Sparse-PIR
We next adapt Chor’s simplest IT-PIR scheme [10] to reduce
the number of database records accessed to answer each query.
As a reminder: in Chor’s scheme the user builds a set of ran-
dom binary vectors of length n (the number of records in the
database), one for each server; we call these vectors the “re-
quest vectors”. These are constructed so that their element-
wise XOR yields a zero for all non-queried records, and a one
for the record sought (we call this the “query vector”). Each
server simply XORs all records corresponding to a 1 in its re-
quest vector, and returns this value to the user. The XOR of all
responses corresponds to the sought record.
Sparse-PIR aims to reduce the computational load on the
database servers DBi. To this end the binary request vec-
tors are not sampled uniformly but are sparse, requiring the
database servers to access and XOR fewer records to answer
each query. Specifically, in Sparse-PIR each request is de-
rived by independently selecting each binary element using a
Bernoulli distribution with parameter θ ≤ 1/2. Furthermore,
the constraint that the XOR of these sparse vectors yields the
query vector is maintained. The intuition is that we will build a
d×n query matrix M column wise: each column (of length d)
corresponds to one record in the database, and will be selected
by performing d independent Bernoulli trials with parameter
θ, re-sampling if necessary to ensure the sum of the entries
in the column (the Hamming weight) is even for non-queried
records, or odd for the single queried record.
Equivalently, we may first select a Hamming weight for
each column with the appropriate probability depending on d,
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θ, and whether the column represents the queried record or not,
and then select a uniformly random vector of length dwith that
Hamming weight. Each row of the query matrix will then have
expected Hamming weight θ·n, and the rows of the matrix (the
request vectors) will XOR to the desired query vector, namely
all 0 except a single 1 at the desired location.
Algorithm 4.4: Sparse-PIR (User)
Input:
Q: 0 ≤ Q < n;
θ: 0 < θ ≤ 12 ;
1 M ← [ ];
2 for 0 ≤ col < n do
3 if col = Q then
4 q ← d Bernoulli(θ) trials with Odd sum;
5 else
6 q ← d Bernoulli(θ) trials with Even sum;
7 M ←M append column q;
8 for 1 ≤ i ≤ d do
9 ri ← row i of M ;
10 respi ← sendreceive(DBi, ri);
11 return
⊕
1≤i≤d respi;
The database logic in Sparse-PIR is identical to the logic
in Chor’s IT-PIR: each database server receives a binary vec-
tor, XORs all records that correspond to entries with a 1, and
responds with the result. In fact the database may be agnostic
to the fact it is processing a sparse PIR request, aside from the
reduction in the number of entries to be XORed. For θ < 0.5
the costs of processing at each database is lowered due to the
relative sparsity of ones, at no additional networking or other
costs.
Security Theorem 3. The Sparse-PIR mechanism is -private
with
 = 4 · arctanh[(1− 2θ)(d−da)],
where θ is the parameter of the Bernoulli distribution and d−
da represents the number of honest PIR servers.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
As expected when θ = 1/2 the privacy provided by the
Sparse-PIR mechanism is the same as for the perfect IT-PIR
mechanism. This fact can be derived from the tight bound on
 by observing that  equals zero when θ = 1/2.
Security Lemma 1. For θ = 1/2, and at least one honest
server, the Sparse-PIR mechanism provides perfect privacy,
namely with  = 0.
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Fig. 3. Sparse-PIR:  versus θ for d = 100
More interestingly, as the number of honest servers increases,
the privacy of the Sparse-PIR increases for any θ, and in the
limit becomes perfect as in standard IT-PIR:
Security Lemma 2. For an increasing number of honest
servers (d−da)→∞ the Sparse-PIR mechanism approaches
perfect privacy, namely → 0.
Proof. Note that for 0 < θ < 1, limx→∞(1− 2θ)x = 0. Thus
for (d − da) → ∞ we have that  → 0, since arctanh(0) =
0.
Costs. In Sparse-PIR, the client requests the XOR of θ · n
records from each of the d servers. As above, how best to do
this depends on the size of θ. If θ > 1lgn , then sending an n-bit
bitmask to each of the d servers will do (just as in the standard
Chor case, where effectively θ = 12 ); if θ is smaller, however,
then listing the θ · n indices, at a cost of θ · n dlgne bits for
each of the d servers is cheaper. The total client communica-
tion cost is therefore Cc = d ·min (n, θ · n dlgne). On each of
the d servers, only θ · n records are accessed and operated on
per request, and a single record is sent. We thus have Cs = d
and Cp = θ · d · n · (cacc + cprc).
Practical values. Fig. 3 shows Sparse-PIR curves representing
 as a function of θ for different adversaries in the reference
scenario of Certificate Transparency with d = 102. The secu-
rity parameter  starts below 10 and slowly diminishes until
nearly all of the records have been accessed for θ = 12 where
the curves follow a vertical asymptote. The difference in  for
different adversaries is noticeable at any point of the curves.
In order to achieve even a mediocre security of  < 1, except
for the worst case da = d − 1, accessing 10% of the records
at each database is enough. In the worst-case scenario where
only one database is not colluding, we find the security pa-
rameter  is approximately equal to 2 for θ = 0.25. However
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if only half of the databases are corrupted, i.e. da = 12 · d, we
have  ≈ 10−15 for the same θ. To summarize for d = 102
and θ = 0.25, if da = d − 1 we have  ≈ 2 while if da = d2 ,
we have  ≈ 10−15.
In the case of a small database systems managing a few to
tens of databases, we set d = 10. When the adversary controls
all databases but one, we have the  ≈ 2 while when half of
the databases are corrupted, da = 12 ·d, we have  ≈ 10−1. To
summarize for d = 10 and θ = 0.25, if da = d − 1 we have
 ≈ 2 while if da = d2 , we have  ≈ 10−1.
A sparse version of the simple Chor scheme can indeed
protect the user’s privacy better than the direct request, as we
can observe a factor of 9 between the two epsilons. Yet, in
the worst-case scenario, where the adversary controls all the
databases except one, the risk is still significant: the adversary
infers that the user is about 7 times more likely to seek a partic-
ular record over another. Thus we consider strengthening the
system through composition with an anonymous channel.
4.4 Anonymous Sparse-PIR
We consider the composition of the Sparse-PIR mechanism
with an anonymity system. In this setting, a number of users u
select their queries to the database servers, and perform them
anonymously through an anonymity system. We consider that
all requests from the same user are linkable to each other at the
input and output of the anonymity system. As per our standard
setting, the adversary provides a target user Ut with queries
Qi and Qj , one of which the user chose, and all other u − 1
users with Qnk ∈ Qn. They all use an arbitrary -private PIR
mechanism through an anonymity channel to perform their re-
spective queries.
We will show that this mechanism is -private, through
first proving a general composition lemma. This could be of in-
dependent interest to designers of private query systems based
on anonymous channels.
Composition Lemma. The composition of an arbitrary 1-
private PIR mechanism with a perfect anonymity system used
by u users, for sufficiently large u, yields an 2-private PIR
mechanism with:
2 = ln(e21 + u− 1)− ln u.
Proof. See Appendix A.4. Note this is not a worst-case anal-
ysis, but an average-case analysis over the honest users’
randomness, which can not be influenced by the adversary.
Namely there is a negligible probability in u, the number
of users in the anonymity system, this does not hold. A
Algorithm 4.5: Anonymous Sparse-PIR (User)
Input:
Q: 0 ≤ Q < n;
θ: 0 < θ ≤ 12 ;
1 M ← [ ];
2 for 0 ≤ col < n do
3 if col = Q then
4 q ← d Bernoulli(θ) trials with Odd sum;
5 else
6 q ← d Bernoulli(θ) trials with Even sum;
7 M ←M append column q;
8 for 1 ≤ i ≤ d do
9 ri ← row i of M ;
10 respi ← anonsendreceive(DBi, ri);
11 return
⊕
1≤i≤d respi;
fuller (, δ)-privacy definition could capture the worst-case be-
haviour.
It is easy to show that as u → ∞, the parameter 2 → 0,
leading to a perfect IT-PIR mechanism, independently of the
value of 1 (so long as it is finite). Conversely, when u = 1,
we have 2 = 21 (the loss of a factor of 2 is due to the lack of
tightness of the bound). Using this lemma, we can prove our
main theorem.
Security Theorem 4. The composition of the Sparse-PIR
scheme with parameters θ, d, and da with an anonymity system
with u users is also -private with security parameter
 = ln
((
1 + (1− 2θ)(d−da)
1− (1− 2θ)(d−da)
)4
+ u− 1
)
− ln u.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of the Composition
Lemma, the security parameter of Sparse-PIR, and the defi-
nition of arctanh.
Cost The use of an anonymity system does not change any of
the communication or computation costs. The communication
costs remain Cc = d · min (n, θ · n dlgne) and Cs = d, and
the computation cost remains Cp = θ · d · n · (cacc + cprc).
Practical values. Fig. 4 shows Sparse-PIR composed with
anonymity system curves representing  as a function of θ
for different adversaries in the reference scenario of Certificate
Transparency, with d = 102 and u = 103. The security param-
eter  starts below 10 and slowly diminishes until nearly all of
the records have been accessed for θ = 12 where the curves fol-
low a vertical asymptote. If the anonymity system gains appear
negative at the beginning of the curves, this is due to the lack
of tightness of the bound in the Composition Lemma. The dif-
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Fig. 4. AS-Sparse-PIR:  versus θ for d = 100 and u = 103
ference in  for different adversary is noticeable at any point
of the curves. In order to achieve even a mediocre security
of  < 1, except for the worst case da = d − 1, accessing
more than 10% of the records at each database is enough. In
the worst-case scenario where only one database is not col-
luding, assuming there are 1000 users, we find the security
parameter  is approximately equal to 10−1. However, if only
half of the databases are corrupted (i.e., da = 12 · d), we have
 < 10−15. To summarize for d = 102, u = 103 and θ = 0.25,
if da = d − 1 we have  ≈ 10−1 while if da = d2 , we have
 < 10−15.
In the case of a small database system managing a few to
tens of databases we set d = 10. When the adversary controls
all databases but one, if there are 1000 users, each sending
only one request per database, we have the  ≈ 10−1 while
when half of the databases are corrupted, da = 12 · d, we have
 ≈ 10−3. To summarize for d = 10, u = 103 and θ = 0.25,
if da = d − 1 we have  ≈ 10−1 while if da = d2 , we have
 ≈ 10−3.
Anonymous Sparse-PIR allows us to easily trade off θ
(which governs the server-side cost of the protocol) with u (the
number of simultaneous users of the database). If the num-
ber of users is high, then by composing Sparse-PIR with an
anonymity system, we can reduce θ and still achieve a low .
5 Optimizing PIR
In this section, we propose an optimization for PIR systems to
render them more scalable, but at a higher risk.
5.1 Subset-PIR
In order to lower both the communication and computation
costs, when d 1, one could consider doing IT-PIR on a sub-
set of just t of the databases. We call this optimization Subset-
PIR. This optimization applies to any IT-PIR protocol, so long
as that protocol can be used with a client-selected number of
replicated servers. Chor’s protocol is an example of such a
flexible IT-PIR protocol.
The communication and server side computation costs are
thus multiplied by a factor of td at the cost of a greater risk
of all contacted databases being compromised. Consequently,
even if an IT-PIR scheme were perfectly private, this optimiza-
tion induces a non-zero probability of the adversary being able
to breach it.
Algorithm 5.1: Subset-PIR (User)
Input:
Q: 0 ≤ Q < n;
t: 2 ≤ t ≤ d;
1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ t− 1 do
2 Pj ← n Bernoulli(12 ) trials;
// eQ is the vector with all 0s
except a 1 at position Q
3 Pt ←
(
⊕t−1j=1Pj
)
⊕ eQ;
4 DB ← {};
5 while |DB| ≤ t do
6 server← random(d);
7 if server /∈ DB then
8 DB ← DB ∪ {server};
9 for 1 ≤ j ≤ t do
10 respj ← sendreceive(DBDB[i], Pj);
11 return
⊕
i∈t respi;
Security Theorem 5. Subset-PIR is an (, δ)-private PIR op-
timization with
 = 0 and δ =
t−1∏
i=0
da − i
d− i
where d is the number of databases, of which da are compro-
mised, and t represents the number of PIR servers contacted.
When t > da the mechanism provides unconditional privacy.
Proof. The probability of contacting t databases out of which
ta are compromised, knowing that there are in total da com-
promised databases out of d is:
Pr (ta, t | da) =
(
da
ta
) · (d−dat−ta )(
d
t
)
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Fig. 5. Subset-PIR: δ versus t for d = 100
The probability of contacting only compromised
databases is obtained by setting ta = t, and so is
(dat )
(dt)
, which
equals
∏t−1
i=0
da−i
d−i if t ≤ da, and 0 if t > da.
Costs. For Subset-PIR, as we contact t databases, we have
Cs = t and using a Chor-like PIR protocol we have the com-
putation cost Cp = 12 · t · n · (cacc + cprc).
Practical values. Fig. 5 shows Subset-PIR curves represent-
ing δ as a function of the number of databases contacted t
for different adversaries in the reference scenario of Certifi-
cate Transparency, with d = 102. The security parameter δ
starts between 10−1 and 1 and slowly diminishes until a tenth
to most of the databases have been contacting depending on da
where the curves follow a vertical asymptote at t = d. The dif-
ference in δ for different adversaries is noticeable at any point
of the curves. In order to achieve even a mediocre security of
δ < 10−1, excluding the worst case da = d − 1, less than
20% of the databases have to be contacted. In the worst-case
scenario where only one database is not colluding assuming
the user contacts only a tenth of the databases, we find the se-
curity parameter δ is approximately equal to 0.9. However if
only half of the databases are corrupted (i.e., da = 12 · d), we
have δ ≈ 10−4. To summarize for d = 102 and t = 110 · d,
if da = d − 1 we have δ ≈ 0.9 while if da = d2 , we have
δ ≈ 10−4.
In the case of a small database system managing a few
to tens of databases, each storing thousands of records, we set
d = 10. When the adversary controls all databases but one, if
the user contacts a tenth of the databases, we have that δ ≈ 0.9
while when half of the databases are corrupted, da = 12 ·d, we
have δ ≈ 0.5. To summarize for d = 10 and t = 110 · d,
if da = d − 1 we have δ ≈ 0.9 while if da = d2 , we have
δ ≈ 0.5.
Perfectly private ( = 0) IT-PIR designs used in conjunc-
tion with the Subset-PIR optimization become (, δ)-private
with  = 0 and δ reasonably small, if the number of honest
database servers is large. Indeed, Subset-PIR is still perfectly
private, with  = δ = 0, if the number of servers contacted (t)
exceeds the number of adversarial servers (da).
Demmler et al. [12] explore a similar idea with their
RAID-like design of a PIR system. In RAID-PIR, rather than
the client only contacting a subset of the servers, it instead di-
vides the database and the queries into chunks, and sends the
query chunks corresponding to database chunk i to just t of the
servers. By systematically picking which t servers to use for
each chunk, however, RAID-PIR does contact all d servers, but
each server only does t/d of the work it would ordinarily do,
and indeed, each server need only store a t/d fraction of the
database, if all clients are required to use the same value of t.
Using only this feature of RAID-PIR yields a scheme with the
same communication and computation costs as Subset-PIR.
RAID-PIR goes further, however, and proposes to generate
most of the random query values using a PRNG rather than a
truly random string. This greatly reduces the client-to-server
communication cost of RAID-PIR, at the cost of changing
RAID-PIR from an IT-PIR protocol to a CPIR protocol [16,
footnote 1].
6 Comparative Evaluation
In Table 1, we summarize for each scheme presented the se-
curity parameters  and δ, the communication costs Cs, the
number of blocks sent back to the user, and the computational
costCp which depends on the access cost cacc and the process-
ing cost cprc; i.e., the cost associated to the number of records
XORed.
When the protocols are not fully private (i.e.,  6= 0),
we observe a reduction in the server computation costs. The
Sparse-PIR scheme diminishes the computation cost by a fac-
tor of 2 · θ compared to Chor PIR [10], while the Direct Re-
quest schemes induce no record processing. As the use of an
anonymity system raises the privacy level, the security param-
eter can be lowered to reach the same privacy level of the
schemes at the cost of network delays. The Sparse-PIR meth-
ods do not influence the communication cost, but the Direct
Request schemes drastically increase it as the number of re-
quests p is a multiple of d.
The Subset-PIR optimization schemes helps scalability by
reducing all costs by a factor of td , but turns -private protocols
into (, δ)-private ones.
The two main approaches for decreasing the computation
are contacting fewer databases and accessing (or processing)
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 δ Cc Cs Cp
Chor PIR [10] 0 0 d · n d 12 · d · n · (cacc + cprc)
Direct Requests ln
( 1
d−da ·
(
d · n−1
p−1 − da
))
0 min (d · n, p dlgne) p p · cacc
Sparse-PIR 4 · arctanh[(1− 2θ)(d−da)] 0 d ·min (n, θ · n dlgne) d θ · d · n · (cacc + cprc)
AS-Request ln
(
1
u
(
d
d−da ·
n−1
p−1 − dad−da
)2
+ u−1
u
)
0 min (d · n, p dlgne) p p · cacc
AS-Sparse-PIR ln
(
1
u
(
1+(1−2θ)(d−da)
1−(1−2θ)(d−da)
)4
+ u−1
u
)
0 d ·min (n, θ · n dlgne) d θ · d · n · (cacc + cprc)
Subset-PIR 0
∏t
i=0
da−i
d−i t · n t 12 · t · n · (cacc + cprc)
Table 1. Security and Cost Summary of the Schemes. The client communication Cc is measured in bits,
while the server communication Cs is measured in units of b-bit records.
fewer records per server. It can be noted, for example, that in
order for Sparse-PIR to achieve a similar level of computation
to Subset-PIR with a given t, the parameter θ must be particu-
larly low, θ = t4·d . The first approach would be relevant in the
case of a quasi-trusted database system while the second in the
case of a large untrusted one.
In Figure 6, we compare the computation cost Cp, the
number of records accessed, and the communication cost Cs,
the number of records sent, of the Direct Request and Sparse-
PIR schemes, and their compositions with an anonymity sys-
tem, for a system comparable to Certificate Transparency
when the adversary controls half of the databases. If the costs
of the designs with an anonymity system first appear greater
than in the simple case, this can be explained by the lack of
tightness of the bound in the Composition Lemma. The gains
of the anonymity system can be seen by the values  takes un-
der the lines “DR” and “SP” which represent the last security
value respectively for the Direct Request and Sparse-PIR de-
signs without an anonymity system.
In Figures 6a and 6c, we show the privacy parameter  as
a function of the whole database system computation cost Cp
and compare it between the two PIR designs and their compo-
sition with an anonymity system. For the Direct Request cases,
Cp represents the total number of records accessed p while for
Sparse-PIR ones this is the sum of the records accessed by
each database θ · d · n. This difference is worth mentioning as
by definition a record can be accessed and sent only once in the
Direct Request cases, while in the Sparse-PIR ones, a record
can be accessed and processed at different servers. Thus, the
privacy level will converge to 0 for p = d with the Direct Re-
quest protocols but for θ = 12 , or p =
1
2 · d · n in the graphs,
with the Sparse-PIR protocols. While both figures show  de-
creasing with Cp, the Direct Request protocols perform better
for a given Cp than the Sparse-PIR ones which however ap-
pear more flexible as the security parameter  can be selected
in a wider interval.
In Figures 6b and 6d, we show  as a function of the num-
ber of records sent back by the whole database system to the
user and compare it between the PIR designs and their compo-
sitions with an anonymity system. While the privacy level does
not depend on Cs for the Sparse-PIR protocols, as the number
of requests sent and record received is a constant, Cs has to
greatly increase to reach an adequate  in the Direct Request
cases.
While the Direct Requests protocols present lower com-
putational costs than the Sparse-PIR ones, they vastly increase
the communication costs. This is not a surprise as PIR was
conceived in order to limit the communication cost of pri-
vate search in public databases. Choosing which method to
use thus depends on the database system characteristics, not
only the number of database servers and the level of trust the
user has, but also the hardware. One method can be used to
counter the system bottleneck, Sparse-PIR would suit servers
with fast processors while Direct Request would adapt better
with high-speed networks. As both processing and networking
capabilities are continually increasing, the question of whether
Direct Request schemes have a future is still open.
6.1 Discussion
6.1.1 Sybil Attacks
In a n− 1, or Sybil, attack, an adversary acquires a dispropor-
tionately large influence on a system by creating a large num-
ber of identities. In this work, such an attack would translate
when using the anonymity system to the adversary controlling
or being most to all of the non-target clients. As a result, the
number of honest users is drastically diminished, and so the
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Fig. 6. Parameterized plots for Direct Request and Sparse-PIR, AS-Direct Request, and AS-Sparse-PIR, for d = 102, da = d2 , n = 10
6,
and u = 103. The dots in the figures show the varying parameter p (for the Direct Request schemes) or θ (for the Sparse-PIR schemes).
adversary can guess with higher probability which queries are
the target’s. In the worst case when there are no honest non-
target users, the system can be reduced to one not using an
anonymity system (choosing u − 1 = 0 in the composition
lemma leads to 2 = 2 · 1 because of the bound looseness).
Without using a central entity, solutions to counter Sybil
attacks are limited, especially when maintaining anonymity.
Usual techniques to counter Sybil attacks could be adapted,
such as admission control by verifying external identifiers in
order to submit requests, requiring a proof of work to in-
crease the cost of Sybil attacks, or deploying social-graph-
based Sybil detection.
7 Conclusions
We show that -private PIR can be instantiated by a number
of systems, using dummy queries, anonymous channels, and
variants of the classic Chor protocol. Yet some popular naive
designs based on dummies or anonymous channels alone fail
to provide even this weaker notion of privacy. We argue that
the weaker protection provided by -private PIR may be suf-
ficient to provide some privacy in systems that are so large
in terms of database size, but also so popular, that current IT-
PIR techniques are impossible to apply. With a large fraction
of honest servers even weak (but still -private) variants of
PIR, such as Sparse-PIR, provide near-perfect privacy. Show-
ing that a system is -private enables smooth composition with
an anonymity system, which guarantees that any anonymized
-private PIR mechanism becomes near perfect given a large
enough anonymity set.
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A Proofs of Theorems
A.1 Proof of Composing Naive
Mechanisms
Proof. We want to prove in our indistinguishability game sce-
nario that the probability the adversary observes exactly u
queries Qi is bounded above by δu ≤
(
p−1
n−1
)u−1
while the
probability they receive no Qi queries is bounded above by
δ0 ≤
(
n−p
n−1
)u−1
. We first assume that the probability a user
chooses one of the two queries (Qi) given by the adversary is
PrT .
The probability a non-target user Uk selects this very Qi
out of his p− 1 randomly selected requests (the pth one being
the adversarially provided non-target query Qnk ) is
(n−2p−2)
(n−1p−1)
=
p−1
n−1 as each record can only be requested once by any given
user. As each user is independent, the probability all the users
select Qi is the product of the probabilities, we thus have
δu = PrT
(
p−1
n−1
)u−1
. Similarly, the probability a non-target
user does not select this very Qi out of his p− 1 randomly se-
lected requests is
(n−2p−1)
(n−1p−1)
= n−pn−1 . As each user is independent,
the probability none of the users selects Qi is the product of
the probabilities, so δ0 = PrT
(
n−p
n−1
)u−1 ≤ (n−pn−1)u−1, and
similarly for δu.
A.2 Proof of Security Theorem 1 (Direct
Requests)
Proof. We want to prove the following result.
L = PiPj =
Pr(Observation | QTarget = Qi)
Pr(Observation | QTarget = Qj)
≤ 1
d− da ·
(
d · n− 1
p− 1 − da
)
We first note that the best observation for the adversary is
to see exactly one of the adversarially provided target requests,
for instance Qi.
In the first case, the adversary supposes Qi was sent. Qj
may also have been sent, but in this case a non-colluding
database would have received it.
Pi = da
d
·
(
n− 1
p− 1
)−1
·
[(
n− 2
p− 1
)
+ d− da
d
·
(
n− 2
p− 2
)]
= da
d
·
(
n− 1
p− 1
)−1
·
[(
n− 1
p− 1
)
− da
d
·
(
n− 2
p− 2
)]
= da
d
·
[
1− da
d
· p− 1
n− 1
]
In the second case, the adversary supposes Qj was sent
however she only sees Qi. Qj must thus have been received
by a non-colluding database.
Pj = da
d
· d− da
d
·
(
n− 2
p− 2
)
·
(
n− 1
p− 1
)−1
= da
d
· d− da
d
· p− 1
n− 1
Therefore we obtain the result:
L = PiPj ≤
da
d ·
[
1− dad · p−1n−1
]
da
d · d−dad · p−1n−1
≤ d
d− da ·
n− 1
p− 1 −
da
d− da
≤ 1
d− da ·
(
d · n− 1
p− 1 − da
)
This concludes the proof.
A.3 Proof of Security Theorem 2
(Sparse-PIR)
Proof. We represent the p requests sent by the user by
{0, 1}1×n vectors listed in a d × n matrix, each column rep-
resenting a record and each row a request. The adversary A
controlling only a set of the databases will only see some of
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the rows.A is interested in the number of ones in the columns,
these numbers representing how many times each record has
been requested.
We first note that the probability an (d, θ)-Binomial vari-
able is even is 12 +
1
2 (1− 2θ)d. [29]
The adversary observes only the part of each column vi
corresponding to the corrupt servers da. We call the adversary
observation for column i, oi, and the hidden part of the vector
hi. Without loss of generality we consider that vi ← oi|hi
namely that the column for entry i is the concatenation of the
observed and the hidden part of the column.
We denote the event the user queried for record α as Qα.
For such a query our mechanism would set the column α,
namely vα, to have odd Hamming weight, and all other col-
umn vβ , β 6= α to have even Hamming weight.
To prove that the mechanism is differentially private we
need to show that:
Pr[∀i.oi|Qα]
Pr[∀i.oi|Qβ ] ≤ e

However, each column of the query is sampled independently
of all others, and thus it suffices to prove that:∏
∀i. Pr[oi|Qα]∏
∀i. Pr[oi|Qβ ]
≤ e
Since Pr[oi|Qα]/Pr[oi|Qβ ] = 1 for i /∈ {α, β}, this expres-
sion simplifies to:
Pr[oα|Qα] · Pr[oβ |Qα]
Pr[oα|Qβ ] · Pr[oβ |Qβ ] ≤ e

We have the following cases depending on the observed par-
ity of oi, based on the expected parity of the full, and partly
unobserved, vi and vj :
Pr[oi odd|Qi] = Pr[hi even]
Pr[oi even|Qi] = Pr[hi odd] = 1− Pr[hi even]
Pr[oj odd|Qi] = Pr[hj odd] = 1− Pr[hj even]
Pr[oj even|Qi] = Pr[hj even]
For θ < 1/2, it is the case that Pr[hi even] > Pr[hi odd]
and the differential privacy bound is minimized for:
Pr[oα odd|Qα] · Pr[oβ even|Qα]
Pr[oα odd|Qβ ] · Pr[oβ even|Qβ ] =
Pr[hα even] · Pr[hβ even]
Pr[hα odd] · Pr[hβ odd] =
Pr[hα even]2
Pr[hα odd]2
=(
1/2 + 1/2(1− 2θ)|hi|
1− (1/2 + 1/2(1− 2θ)|hi|)
)2
=(
1 + (1− 2θ)|hi|
1− (1− 2θ)|hi|
)2
The value of  such that this expression is bounded above by
e can be expressed in terms of an inverse hyperbolic tangent
(arctanh x = 12 ln
( 1+x
1−x
)
; |x| < 1):
 = 4 · arctanh(1− 2θ)|hi|
This concludes the proof and the upper bound is tight.
A.4 Proof of the Composition Lemma
Proof. We consider the observationsO0 . . .Ou−1 as originat-
ing from the 1-private PIR mechanism used by users U0 to
Uu−1 respectively. Without loss of generality we consider the
target user Ut is U0. We try to determine a bound on the fol-
lowing quantity to prove -privacy:
Pr(O0 . . .Ou−1|Qi, Qn1 . . . Qnu−1)
Pr(O0 . . .Ou−1|Qj , Qn1 . . . Qnu−1)
≤ e2
However, due to the use of the anonymity system the adversary
has a uniform belief about the matching of all observations to
all queries, out of the u! possible matchings. Thus we have
that:
Pr(O0 . . .Ou−1|Qx, Qn1 . . . Qnu−1) =
= 1
u!
u−1∑
i=0
(u− 1)! Pr(Oi|Qx)
∏
j 6=i
Pr(Oj |Qnj )
= 1
u
u−1∑
i=0
Pr(Oi|Qx)
∏
j 6=i
Pr(Oj |Qnj )
The quantity to be bounded can therefore be re-written as:
1
u
∑u−1
i=0 Pr(Oi|Qx)
∏
j 6=i Pr(Oj |Qnj )
1
u
∑u−1
i=0 Pr(Oi|Qy)
∏
j 6=i Pr(Oj |Qnj )
=
Pr(O0|Qx)
∏
j 6=0 Pr(Oj |Qnj )
+
∑
i6=0 Pr(Oi|Qx)
∏
j 6=i Pr(Oj |Qnj )∑u−1
i=0 Pr(Oi|Qy)
∏
j 6=i Pr(Oj |Qnj )
We are now making a simplifying assumption: We con-
sider that Pr(Oi|Qz) = µ if the observation Oi was indeed
produced by the query Qz , and ν otherwise, and also µ > ν.
We rely on the law of large numbers for this assumption to
approximate reality, and it is not sensitive to adversary inputs.
Since the PIR mechanism is -private we know that µ ≤ e1ν.
This simplifying assumption holds for large numbers of u,
since products of multiple individual Pr(Oi|Qz) will tend to
be products of the average µ and ν.
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The quantity to be bounded now reduces to:
µ2µu−2 + (u− 1)ν2µu−2
ν2µu−2 + (u− 1)ν2µu−2 =
µ2 + (u− 1)ν2
uν2
=(
µ
ν
)2 + u− 1
u
≤
(e1)2 + u− 1
u
=
eln(e
21+u−1)−lnu
This concludes the proof.
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